Taxation of Non-Indians Transacting Business on Reservations—State Taxes Imposed upon Non-Indian Mineral Lessees Infringe Tribal Right of Self-Government by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 60 
Issue 2 Topics in Corporation Law 
January 1982 
Taxation of Non-Indians Transacting Business on 
Reservations—State Taxes Imposed upon Non-Indian Mineral 
Lessees Infringe Tribal Right of Self-Government 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, 
and Mineral Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Taxation of Non-Indians Transacting Business on Reservations—State Taxes Imposed upon Non-Indian 
Mineral Lessees Infringe Tribal Right of Self-Government, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 705 (1982). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/18 
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University 
Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
INDIAN LAW-TAXATION OF NON-INDIANS TRANSACTING BUSINESS
ON RESERVATIONS-STATE TAXES IMPOSED UPON NON-INDIAN MIN-
ERAL LESSEES INFRINGE TRIBAL RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT. CToW
Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). The Crow
Tribe instituted an action in federal district court' seeking a declara-
tion2 that Montana's imposition of coal severance and gross proceeds
taxes' upon non-Indian mining operations on tribal lands interfered
with the tribal right of self-government.4 Dismissing the case for fail-
ure to state a claim, the district court held that state taxation of the
Tribe's mineral lessees produced an insufficient economic effect on the
Tribe to constitute interference with Crow tribal self-government. 5 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and held: Coal severance and gross proceeds
taxation unrelated to governmental costs associated with revenue pro-
duction is preempted by the Mineral Leasing Act of 19386 and is an
1. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont. 1979), rev'd, 650 F.2d
1104 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. The Tribe also sought a declaration that imposition of Montana's severance and gross
proceeds taxes upon non-Indian reservation coal mining operations: (1) violated article 1, section
8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution which vests in Congress the exclusive authority "[t]o
regulate Commerce... with the Indian Tribes"; (2) deprived "the Tribe of rights guaranteed to
it by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 and the Treaty of Fort Laramie"; and (3) reduced the
ability of the Tribe to realize the full benefit of their land thereby depriving them of liberty and
property in violation of the due process provisions of the fourteenth amendment. 469 F. Supp. at
156-58. The district court dismissed each claim. Id. at 158.
Courts consistently accord Indian tribes special consideration under the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1831). Nevertheless, the standard
for application of the "Indian Commerce Clause" frequently has been measured by traditional
commerce clause analyses. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir.
1980), aft'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4169 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1982) (No. 80-11). Cf. Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 159 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (congressional Indian commerce clause
power expanded by Indian status as wards of the nation).
3. See notes 43-46 infra and accompanying text.
4. 469 F. Supp. at 157, 161-62. See notes 57-62 bifra and accompanying text.
5. The district court finessed the self-government issue by holding that the Tribe could have
avoided the substantial adverse economic impact complained of by exacting increased royalties.
469 F. Supp. at 161. The court of appeals characterized the Tribe's complaint as seeking a decla-
ration concerning future production. The Tribe alleged that the state tax would reduce the royal-
ties generated by future production leases. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104,
1113 n.13 (1981).
6. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1976). See also 25 C.F.R. §§ 171.1-30, 173.1-29 (1981). The
1938 Act permits an Indian "tribe, group, or band of Indians under Federal jurisdiction" to lease
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invalid incursion of tribal self-government 7 when the taxed revenue is
derived from the value generated upon the reservation. 8
The doctrine of tribal jurisdictional sovereignty originated in 1832
with Worcester v. Georgia.9 State authorities arrested Samuel Worces-
ter for violating a Georgia law requiring state permission for non-Indi-
ans to reside on Cherokee territory. 10 The United States Supreme
Court held that the state lacked jurisdiction and voided the arrest."1
Indian communities, Chief Justice Marshall ruled, are distinct political
entities in which tribal authority is exclusive.' 2 The Court determined
that tribal authority is protected, inter alia, by the preemptive effect of
treaties between tribes and the federal government' 3 and congressional
legislation. 4
its lands for mining purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 396a
(1976). See also 650 F.2d at 1112 n.9.
7. Cf. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980) (indirect bur-
den of New Mexico's gross receipts tax levied on non-Indian contractor insufficient to constitute
interference with the internal affairs of the Mescaleros); Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernadino
County, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (imposition of county possessory interest tax on non-Indian
lessees of trust land not invalid as an interference with tribal self-government); Tiffany Construc-
tion Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 96 N.M. 296, 629 P.2d 1225 (1981) (indirect burden of proceeds tax
does not interfere with tribal self-government).
8. 650 F.2d at 117. See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57
(1980).
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The rationale of Worcester was first applied to preclude a
state tax upon Indian-held real property in The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866). See
also The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866).
10. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515. For a discussion of the factual background and the historical and
constitutional significance of the Worcester decision, see Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in
Law, Politics, andMorali , 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969). See also D. GErCHES, D. ROSENFELT &
C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 157-75 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDIAN LAW].
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562-63.
12. Id. at 561. Although concurring in the judgment, Justice McLean disagreed with the
Chief Justice's broad characterization of Cherokee rights and stated that "[t]he exercise of the
power of self-government by the Indians, within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be tem-
porary .... [A] sound national policy does require that the Indian tribes within our states
should exchange their territories, upon equitable principles, or, eventually, consent to become
amalgamated in our political communities." Id. at 593 (McLean, J., concurring). See Burke,
supra note 10, at 523-24.
For a general discussion of the concept of tribal sovereignty, see FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 10, at 253-99. See also McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal,
State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rav. 357 (1978); Mettler, A Un ifed Theory of
Indian Tribal Sovereignt, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 89 (1978); Werhan, The Sovereignty ofIndan Tribes-
A Reaffirmation and Strengthening in the 1970s, 54 NOTRE DA.IE LAW. 5 (1978).
13. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 549-56. See Clinton, State Power Over Reservations: A Critical Com-
ment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D.L. Rav. 401 (1981).
14. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-57.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/18
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Worcester implied that a tribal right of self-government was ulti-
mately dependent upon the will of Congress.15 Chief Justice Marshall,
however, did not base his decision solely on the preemptive effect of
any particular statute or treaty. Rather, he perceived tribal self-govern-
ment as an independent barrier to state action. 16 Consequently, two
tests evolved from Worcester: first, whether the state action is pre-
empted by federal statute or treaty;1 7 and second, whether the state ac-
tion interferes with the tribal right of self-government.18  The
dependence of the latter test on preemption analysis, however, pro-
vided the basis for its subsequent erosion as an independent barrier.'9
In the tax context, and in particular, when a state has attempted to tax
non-Indian, on-reservation activity, the principle of tribal self-govern-
ment has rarely precluded the state action.20
Williams v. Lee,2" although not a tax case, articulated the basis of the
modern approach for analyzing the self-government principle in state-
Indian taxation disputes.22 In Williams, the Supreme Court denied
15. Id. at 560. Chief Justice Marshall declared that "Indian nations [possess] a full right to
the lands they [occupy], until that right should be extinguished by the United States . I." d.
See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
16. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community... in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter, but with the assent ofthe Cherokees themselves. Id. (emphasis added). See also F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122-23 (1971).
17. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
18. See, e.g., Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979); Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1958).
19. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171-73 (1973).
20. See, ag, Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Fort
Mojave Tribe v. San Bernadino County, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977); Agua Cliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir.
1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972). See generally Craig, The Indian Tax Cases-A Territorial
Ana/sis, 9 N.M. L. REv. 221, 238-54 (1979).
For examples of early decisions in which state taxation authority over non-Indians transacting
business on the reservation was upheld, see Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898); Utah & North-
em Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885). Federal preemption is the more frequent basis for preclu-
sion of State taxation of non-Indian activities on reservations. See notes 27 & 29 infra and
accompanying text.
21. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
22. See, ag., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); Washing-
ton v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 140 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482-83 (1976); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-73
1973). Cf. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 687 n.3 (1965) (Wi-
hams cited to support statement that state laws may apply to reservations when they do not inter-
fere with federal policies concerning the reservations). For a discussion of Williams as providing
Number 21
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state jurisdiction over a debt collection action brought by a non-Indian
against a reservation Indian.2 3 Nevertheless, the Court refused to rec-
ognize tribal authority as exclusive, even within reservation bounda-
ries, and implied that Worcester would not bar state action that did not
infringe upon the tribe's right to make and be ruled by its own laws.24
In McClanahan v. State Tax Commission2" the Supreme Court,
troubled by the conceptual problems inherent in the self-government
standard, declared that Indian sovereignty merely provided a backdrop
against which preemption analysis was to proceed.2 6  The Court read
Williams as having espoused a preemption doctrine rather than the
self-government standard.2 7  Post-McClanahan state-Indian tax deci-
the modem analysis for questions involving tribal sovereignty, see Comment, The Case/or Exclu.
sive TribalPower to Tax Mineral Lessees a/Indian Lands, 124 U. PA. L. Rav. 491, 511-15 (1975).
But see Note, Balancing the Interests in Taxation ofANon-Indan Activities on Indian Lands, 64
IoWA L. REv. 1459, 1494-98 (1979) (argued that Williams employed and intended a preemption
test).
23. 358 U.S. at 223.
24. Some commentators maintain that the Williams Court created a broad presumption of no
state jurisdiction on the reservation in the absence of congressional legislation to the contrary.
See, eg., 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1259, 1263 (1981). In the context of a state tax of an on-reservation
non-Indian, however, such a conclusion is doubtful. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) in which the Court stated that:
in the special area of state taxation, absent cession ofjurisdiction or other federal statutes
permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands
arlndian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission ... lays to rest any doubt in this respect
by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.
Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
25. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
26. The Court noted that the Indian sovereignty doctrine had "undergone considerable
evolution [since its establishment in Worcester] in response to changed circumstances." Id. at 171.
It concluded that "[t]he Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a
definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read." Id. at 172.
For a discussion of the unique character of preemption principles in the context of Indian law,
see note 27 byia.
27. After discussing the modification of the Worcester principle as summarized in Wlliams
and noting the trend to escape "from the idea of Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction
and toward reliance on federal preemption," the Court observed that "[t]he modem cases thus
tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and look instead to the applicable
treaties and statutes. . . ." 411 U.S. at 172. For support of the view that preemption has been
the single unifying, though unspoken, principle in the state-tribal jurisdictional disputes since Wil.
liams, see Werhan, supra note 12; Note, supra note 22. Cf. Craig, supra note 20, at 252-54 (sepa-
rate interference with self-government test).
Justice Marshall summarized the Court's current approach to preemption in Indian law in
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980):
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/18
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sions consistently recognize the self-government standard as a check on
state action. The test, however, has lacked independent force or sub-
stance28 apart from the issue of preemption.29
In the context of state taxation, courts often resort to an "interests
analysis" approach. In two decisions, Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation3" and White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 1 the United States Supreme Court recognized the
interests analysis standard as implicit in both the preemption and self-
government tests. This recognition indicated a renewed, albeit subtle,
willingness to give substantive effect to the tribal self-government test.3 2
to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have
emerged in other areas of the law. ... The tradition of Indian sovereignty. . . must
inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by
operation of federal law.. . .Ambiguities in federal law have been construed gener-
ously in order to comport with these traditional notions of sovereignty and with the
federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.
Id. at 143-44 (citations omitted).
28. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
29. The focus on the post-McClanahan decisions has been primarily on preemption. See,
e.g., Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134
(1980); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
30. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
31. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
32. The Court's perception of the more general principle of tribal sovereignty in nontax con-
texts has been restrictive. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The
Court in 0lphant determined that Indian tribes do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), Justice Stewart, commenting on
the principle of tribal sovereign authority, observed that, "Indian tribes still possess those aspects
of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their
dependent status." Id. at 324. The tribe's dependent status, the Court held, implicitly divested it
of aspects of sovereignty "involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the
Tribe." Id. at 326. "These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian tribes
within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to
determine their external relations." Id. But see Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981),
in which Justice Stewart, in discussing the Indian sovereignty principles recently interpreted in
Oiphant and *lieeler, observed:
Though OIhant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the prin-
ciples on which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign pow-
ers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. To be
sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil juris-
diction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe
may regulate, through taxation. . . the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe ..
Id. at 1258.
One explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that Congress has never established political
independence as a federal policy, although it has established Indian economic independence as a
Number 2]
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In Colville several tribes complained that the state could not lawfully
apply its cigarette and tobacco products taxes33 to on-reservation tribal
sales. The district court determined that the state tax, as applied to
sales to either Indians or non-Indians, was preempted by tribal taxing
ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference with tribal
self-government. 3a  The Supreme Court reversed.35  The Court de-
picted the tribe's argument as primarily economic: 36  an exemption
from the state tax is necessary if the tribe is to attract business and raise
revenue to combat severe tribal poverty. Upholding the tax as applied
to on-reservation, non-Indians, the Court stated that congressional con-
cern for fostering tribal self-governance and economic development did
not guarantee the tribes an artificial37 competitive advantage through
an exemption from the state tax.38
The Court noted that the tribal self-government principle required
an accommodation between tribal and federal interests on the one
hand, and state interests on the other.39 Tribal interest, the Court ob-
served, was strongest when the revenue sought to be taxed was "derived
desired goal. See generally Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54
WASH. L. REv. 479 (1979).
33. The identity of the taxed wealth has not been the principle criterion in the state-Indian
tax cases, although the Court has distinguished taxation of trust realty and fixtures from person-
alty. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 155-59 (1973). For a helpful chart
identifying relevant criteria see Barsh, Issues in Federal, State, and Tribal Taxation of Reservation
Wealth: 4 Survey and Economic Critique, 54 WASH. L. REv. 531, 569 (1979).
34. Confederated Tribes v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (three judge
court). The district court opinion constituted a major departure from precedent. Subsequently
some authors envisioned a new doctrine of tribal preemption based upon the conflicting taxing
authority of the tribe. See Barsh, supra note 33, at 570-72.
35. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
36. 447 U.S. at 150-52 (citing Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976)). Although the exemption of marketing the sales tax provided the tribes with a substantial
source of revenue, the Court in Moe upheld imposition of the state tobacco sales tax upon non-
Indian purchasers. The tribe, however, had not enacted a tribal tax. Id. at 482-83.
37. The Court's use of the term "artificial" is unfortunate. The Court squarely upheld the
tribe's own taxes as applied to nontribal purchasers. 447 U.S. at 153. If the tribe's tax is added to
the state's tax, the market for reservation cigarettes will dwindle and tribal economic development
will be thwarted. Cf. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1981)
(substantial incursions into revenues obtained from land-based wealth can destroy tribe's ability
to sustain itself). Terming the tax advantage offered by the tribe "artificial" assumes the answer to
the question of whether the state tax ought to be imposed. See notes 71-73 infra and accompany-
ing text.
38. 447 U.S. at 155.
39. Id. at 156. For an interpretation of interests analysis in the context of state-Indian taxa-
tion, see Note, supra note 22.
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Number 2] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the
Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. ' '4° The
state's interest, on the other hand, was "strongest when the tax is di-
rected at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of
state services.' Colville thus revitalized the precedent that rejected
the self-government principle when the tax involved non-Indians, 42 but
also established that the principle could be upheld when the taxed reve-
nue was derived from value generated on the reservation.43
White Mountain,' decided shortly after Colville, rejected on federal
preemption grounds Arizona's attempt to impose its motor carrier li-
cense tax and its use fuel tax upon a non-Indian enterprise that oper-
ated solely within the reservation. The Court observed that, in disputes
involving a state tax aimed at non-Indian, on-reservation activity, pre-
emption analysis called for careful scrutiny of the nature of the state,
federal, and tribal interests at stake.45 The White Mountain Court did
not reach the self-government question. The Court, however, did ac-
knowledge that the semi-independent status' of Indian tribes gives rise
to an independent barrier to state regulatory authority over tribal reser-
vations. The Court identified this barrier as the self-government test.47
In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana4 1 the Ninth Circuit considered
the validity of Montana's Coal Severance Tax49 and Gross Proceeds
40. 447 U.S. at 156-57.
41. Id. at 157.
42. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
43. See Wofford v. Department of Revenue, 28 Wash. App. 68, 622 P.2d 1278 (1980), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 507 (1981). Cf. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1417 (1981) (state taxation of on-reservation non-Indian contractors
upheld). The court, implicitly balancing the interests of the state and tribe to uphold the state tax,
cryptically noted: "[Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)] leaves no room for
any doctrine of preemption." Id. at 970. See also Tiffany Construction Co. v. Bureau of Revenue,
96 N.M. 296, 629 P.2d 1225 (1981); Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 95
N.M. 708, 625 P.2d 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980),prob.firis. noted, 102 S. Ct. 85 (1981).
44. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
45. Id. at 144-45.
46. Id. at 142. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973):
[Indian tribes have retained] a semi-independent position... not as States, not as na-
tions, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with
the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought
under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.
Id. at 173 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)).
47. 448 U.S. at 142.
48. 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981).
49. MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -111 (1979).
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from Coal Tax. 0 Montana set its severance tax rate for highest quality
coal at thirty percent of value51 after determining that the demand for
coal would tolerate appropriation of one-third of the price for eco-
nomic rents such as production taxes and royalties.52 The Crow,Tribe
alleged that imposition of the state taxes upon non-Indian lessees min-
ing tribal coal severely impaired tribal capacity to generate revenue
from royalties and from the tribe's own taxation.5 3 The Tribe argued
that the taxes interfered with the tribe's ability to govern itself 54 and
50. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-23-701 to -704 (1979).
51. "Value" is defined as the contract sales price. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-35-103(1)
(1979). See also MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-35-107 (1979) (procedure for determining when
coal valuation may be imputed). The state imposes a graduated schedule according to heating
quality:
(1) A severance tax is imposed on each ton of coal produced in the state in accordance
with the following schedule:
Heating Quality Surface Mining Underground Mining
(BTU per pound
of coal)
Under 7,000 12 cents or 20% 5 cents or 3% of value
of value
7,000-8,000 22 cents or 30% 8 cents or 4% of value
of value
8,000-9,000 34 cents or 30% 10 cents or 4% of value
of value
Over 9,000 40 cents or 30% 12 cents or 4% of value
of value
(2) The formula which yields the greater amount of tax in a particular case shall be
used at each point on this schedule.
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-35-103(l)(2) (1979).
The severance rate in Montana is exceptionally high. Cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-29-106 (Cum.
Supp. 1980) (60e/ton after 8,000 tons quarterly); IDAHo CODE § 47-1201 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (2%
of net value); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 143.010-.990 (Baldwin 1977) (4.5% of gross value; property
tax on value of unmined coal). See also Coal Severance Tax: Hearing on . 2695 Before the Senate
Committee on Energy and NaturalRerource, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., table 3, at 73 (1980) (statement
of Hon. David Durenberger). [hereinafter cited as Coal Severance Tax].
The United States Senate recently considered legislation that would put a ceiling on state sever-
ance taxes at 12.5% of value for coal mined on federal and Indian lands. See Coal Severance Tax,
supra.
52. 650 F.2d at 1113. Montana's coal tax generated substantial political controversy. See,
ag., Coal Severance Tax, supra note 51, at 108-10. The tax recently survived a challenge by four
Montana coal producers and 11 of their out-of-state utility company customers who sought a
declaration that the tax is invalid under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; and the
commerce clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101
S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
53. 650 F.2d at 1116. See note 73 infra.
54. Id. at 1111-14 (preemption); Id. at 1115-17 (infringement).
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that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938-- preempted the tax.
After determining that the incidence of the tax fell on the lessees and
thus was not invalid as a direct taxation of tribal mineral holdingsS 6
the court considered the Tribe's preemption argument. The Crow
Tribe court refused to view the Act so broadly as to forbid any state
involvement,57 but noted that a central purpose of the Act was to en-
courage tribal economic development.58 Relying on Whte Mountain,
the court found that to the extent Montana's taxes thwarted and thus
conflicted with the federal and tribal interests reflected in the Act, the
state taxes were preempted.59 The state had no interest in expropria-
ting Indian mineral wealth to perpetuate the acknowledged policy of
preserving the value of nonrenewable assets.6° Further, the court
doubted whether legitimate state interests such as the social and envi-
ronmental burdens of large scale mining would save the tax from its
"fatal conflict" with the 1938 Act.61
Finally, the court in Crow Tribe turned to the self-government argu-
ment. The court observed initially that McClanahan requires the inter-
ests of the state to be balanced against the impact on effective self-
55. 650 F.2d at 1111-14. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1976). See also 25 C.F.R. §§ 171.1-30,
173.1-29 (1980). The 1938 Act provides for Indian tribes, groups, or bands to lease their lands for
mining purposes for a maximum period of ten years, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1976). Lessees are required to furnish surety bonds for compliance
with their lease terms, 25 U.S.C. § 396c (1976). Certain lands, originally including the Crow Res-
ervation in Montana, are excluded from the Act's provisions, 25 U.S.C. § 396f (1976). In 1959,
Congress provided that mineral leases on the Crow Reservation were to be governed by the provi-
sions of the 1938 Act. Act of September 16, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-283, 73 Stat. 565. See also 650
F,2d at 1111-12 nn.6 & 9-11.
56. 650 F.2d at 1110-11. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980); Tiffany Const. Co. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 96 N.M. 296, 629 P.2d 1225 (1981).
57. Characterizations of federal preemption in both the general and Indian contexts take
several forms. See, eg., Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (no
room for the state to legislate on the subject) (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965)); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980)
(state taxation would threaten overruling federal objectives). See also Note, supra note 22, at 1475-
80.
58. 650 F.2d at 1112. The Crow Tribe court also acknowledged that the 1938 Act "sought
uniformity in the law governing mineral leases on Indian lands. . . [and achievement of] the
broad policy of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976), that tribal
governments be revitalized." Id.
59. 650 F.2d at 1114.
60. Id.
61. Id. See Note, supra note 22, at 1477-80.
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governance.6 2 The court determined that the right of self-government,
although related to preemption analysis through its dependence on fed-
eral policy, is an independent barrier to state regulation.63
Accepting the Tribe's allegation that the economic effect of the taxes
on tribal government was severe, the court observed that Colville had
held that erosion of tribal revenues alone was insufficient to invalidate
a state tax.64 The court, however, interpreted Colville to have recog-
nized a limit upon state taxation when the tribal interest outweighed
the state's governmental interests.65  Pursuant to this analysis, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Tribe had a significant interest in its min-
eral resources66 and, to the extent the tax was unrelated to governmen-
tal costs associated with mining Indian coal, the state's interest in
raising revenues was insignificant. Thus the court struck the balance in
favor of the Crow Tribe.67
Crow Tribe reinforces the self-government standard as a separate ele-
ment of the interest analysis employed in state-Indian taxation dis-
putes.68 The semi-independent status of Indian tribes suggests that
separate preemption and self-government barriers to state action are
appropriate. The two-pronged interests analysis, recognized in Colville
and White Mountain and utilized in Crow Tribe, strengthens tribal
rights both economically and politically.69
62. 650 F.2d at 1108-09.
63. Id. at 1110.
64. Id. at 1116.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1117.
67. Id. Cf. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981) (state
hunting and fishing license imposed upon non-Indian hunting and fishing upon reservation does
not violate tribal interest in self-government when state has substantial conservation interest);
Powell v. Farris, 94 Wash. 2d 782, 620 P.2d 525 (1980) (state jurisdiction over accounting for
partnership dissolution in which defendant was tribal Indian and plaintiff a non-Indian upheld).
68. See notes 30-47 supra and accompanying text. The court could have based its reversal
exclusively upon its determination that the 1938 Act had preempted imposition of Montana's coal
taxes. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), in which the
Court recognized two separate barriers to assertion of state authority, but after holding that fed-
eral statutes preempted the state action, found it unnecessary to reach the self-government test.
69. See 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REvia w COMM'N, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., FINAL RE-
PORT 13-21, 24-31 (Comm. Print 1977). Congress has affirmed this policy particularly during the
last decade. See, eg., Indian Self-determination & Educational Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450a-450n (1976). Recently, however, Congress has indicated some ambivalence toward this
position. See, e.g, H.R. 2478, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) (proposal to abolish separate tribal
political status); S. 874, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (limiting Indian fishing rights). For an excel-
lent defense of the present federal policy of tribal autonomy, see Clinton, Isolated in Their Own
[Vol. 60:705
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/18
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By invalidating Montana's coal tax in part as an interference with
Crow tribal self-government, however, the Ninth Circuit extended Col-
ville to its practical limit. Colville suggested that tribal self-government
interests may prevail when the revenue taxed is derived from value
generated by activities involving Indians upon the reservation and
when the taxpayer receives tribal services.7" Crow Tribe revealed that
Colville created an improbable distinction between tribes that have
marketable natural resources and those that do not. The tribe without
marketable natural resources rarely will attract a non-Indian taxpayer
who will generate revenue derived from value associated with the
reservation.7'
The wel-established federal policy of encouraging tribal economic
self-determination merits greater attention than that given by the Court
in Colville. Policy considerations have guided the search for a coherent
doctrine in this area of federal Indian law 72-a search that has grown
more urgent during the current period of state and federal economic
retrenchment in which governmental revenue sources are diminishing.
Formalistic distinctions such as those created in Colville are of small
value.
In Crow Tribe, the Ninth Circuit properly recognized that invalida-
tion of Montana's severance and gross proceeds taxes enables the tribal
government to secure a reasonable return from its natural resources.
The Supreme Court should abandon the unworkable distinction cre-
ated in Colville and recognize a broad tribal interest in revenue
generation.73
B.H. S.
Countr: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L.
RE'. 979 (1981).
70. 447 U.S. at 156-57.
71. See Ickes, Tribal Economic Independence-The Means to Achieve True Tribal Self-
detemination, 26 S.D. L. Rav. 405 (1981). See also Skibine, High Court Blows Political Smoke in
Cigarette Tax Cases, AM. INDIAN J., July, 1980, at 2.
72. In White Mountain the Court observed that its inquiry into disputes involving state taxa-
tion of non-Indians on reservations required an examination of "the language of the relevant
federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions
of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribe independence." 448 U.S. at
144. See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1958).
73. The United States Supreme Court in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 50 U.S.L.W.
4169 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1982) (No. 80-11), a case involving tribal rather than state taxation, upheld the
tribe's power to impose severance taxes on non-Indian lessees' oil and gas production. The Court
noted that the tribal power to tax "derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to
control economic activity within its jurisdiction ... " Id. at 4171. See generally Clinton, supra
note 69.
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